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SECURITY INFORMATION

7 July 1953

US OFFICIALS ONLY

Copy No. 67

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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
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
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## GENERAL



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2. Britain may propose US sponsorship of special UN session if Rhee talks fail:



Britain may propose that the United States call for a special session of the UN General Assembly if the negotiations with Syngman Rhee fail to progress this week. The American embassy in London states that Acting Foreign Secretary Salisbury believes American sponsorship of a special session would be preferable to reluctant American concurrence under pressure from other nations.

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Comment: While British government spokesmen have recently expressed full support for American leadership in Korea, suspicion has increased that the United States cannot be relied

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on to refrain from new and drastic moves. London may therefore now want a reaffirmation of American support for the announced UN objectives in Korea and for the present armistice terms.

The British also apparently believe that such a reaffirmation by the General Assembly as a whole would intensify the moral and political pressure upon Rhee .

3. Vyshinsky re-emphasizes desirability of Korean armistice:

[redacted] Vyshinsky told Ambassador Bohlen during the 4 July embassy reception that it was of the greatest importance that an armistice be concluded. He stated that the Soviet leaders "found it difficult to understand why the US permitted Syngman Rhee to release the prisoners." While displaying cynicism toward Bohlen's explanation that the United States does not control the South Korean government, Vyshinsky nevertheless expressed his conviction that the difficulties with Rhee would be overcome.

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Comment: These remarks, together with the earlier statements of Vyshinsky and Soviet ambassador Kuznetsov [redacted] suggest that Moscow is interested in obtaining a firm guarantee that either Rhee will respect a truce or the US will be able to enforce the truce.

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Vyshinsky's statements imply that Moscow will support a compromise settlement of the prisoner issue. This was also indicated by Kuznetsov's statement that the Chinese demand that all non-repatriates be recaptured should not be taken literally.

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## **SOUTH ASIA**

### **6. Comment on the prospects of a settlement in Kashmir:**

Despite the presence in India of top Kashmiri officials, the prospect of talks between the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers late in July, and the conciliatory statements being made by the leaders of both countries, past experience has demonstrated the fallacy of expecting India to make concessions acceptable to Pakistan for settlement of the Kashmir question.

Partition of Kashmir along the present Indo-Pakistani occupation lines and the establishment of the Vale as an independent or semi-independent area, whose defenses and communications would be guaranteed by both India and Pakistan, would be

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unlikely to lead to political stability. Kashmiri premier Sheikh Abdullah would oppose any diminution of his sphere of influence and would resist any move completely to surround the Vale with Indian and Pakistani territory.

Neither India nor Pakistan, both of which are aware of the opportunistic and pro-Communist leanings of the Abdullah government, would consider an independent Vale of Kashmir to be a good security risk.


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## **EASTERN EUROPE**

### **9. Comment on Hungarian government reorganization:**

The sweeping reorganization of the government and Communist Party in Hungary, accompanied by the announced intent of the new regime to slow down the tempo of socialization and relax past harsh coercive policies, is unparalleled in the Satellites.

While these concessions can be partly explained by critical food shortages and growing popular discontent, they may also be indicative of a sharp change in Soviet tactics throughout the area. Failure of the Hungarian parliament to meet on 17 June as prescribed by the constitution suggests that the changes were being formulated prior to the outbreak of the East German riots.

Recent concessions to Rumanian and Albanian peasants may be preparatory to similar changes in those countries.

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## WESTERN EUROPE

10. West German government believes election outcome hinges on Soviet unity action:

West German government leaders believe that the coalition parties will win the September national elections without difficulty, but that any "sweeping" Soviet unity proposals would completely alter this prospect. According to American officials in Bonn, these leaders anticipate that in the event of such Soviet proposals, the United States would help the Adenauer government by immediately implementing parts of the contractual agreement, demanding the release of German prisoners of war held by the Soviet Union, and holding joint Allied-German consultations on German unity.

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Comment: An opinion poll in early June showed the popularity of Adenauer and his party at an unprecedented high, but also indicated that over 38 percent of the electorate had not yet decided how to vote in the September elections. Any government opposition to a Soviet proposal for free all-German elections under neutral supervision would likely alienate many of the undecided voters.

The West German press has tended to become critical of the government's reluctance to press the Allies for four-power talks.



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